The purpose of this article is to present standard quantum mechanics from an ontological point of view called physical realism: it states that the goal of physics is to study entities of the natural world, existing independently from any particular observer's perception, and obeying universal and intelligible rules. Though the compatibility of physical realism and quantum mechanics has been much debated, we claim here that both are perfectly compatible, provided that what is meant by physical properties is -slightly but profoundly -modified: contrary to the ordinary, classical ontology, physical properties must be attributed jointly to the system, and to the context in which it is embedded. This intrinsically bipartite nature of physical reality sheds new light on counterintuitive features of quantum mechanics such as non-locality or the quantum-classical boundary.
It is well known that physicists, while they all agree about how to use Quantum Mechanics (QM), still all disagree about what it means, and even more about "the real stuff" it describes: that is, its ontology. The purpose of this article is to present standard quantum mechanics, from an ontological point of view called physical realism, stating that the goal of physics is to study entities of the natural world, existing independently from any particular observer's perception, and obeying universal and intelligible rules [1] . Though the compatibility of physical realism and QM has been much debated [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] we claim here that both are perfectly compatible, provided that what is meant by physical properties is -slightly but profoundly -modified.
The argumentation developed in this article may start with the simple question: what is a quantum state ? This question has raised hot debates since the beginning of quantum theory, and current answers still not meet a large agreement between physicists. Before quantum mechanics, "classical" physicists used to work with physical states, that pertained to physical systems. Physical systems are entities of the natural world that can be isolated well enough to study them, measure their properties, i.e. "ask them questions" (what is your position, mass, velocity..). The set of answers resulting from a given set of questions defines a physical state, that is, the ID card of the physical system. Once this ID card is known, the behavior of the system becomes perfectly predictable from the equations of motion, and answers to new questions are predictable as well [12] . In the particular case where the measured properties are constant of the motion, the same questions will invariably give the same answers, whatever their total number, or the ordering of their sequence. As a consequence, the ID card or "physical state" is attributed to the system itself, and guarantees that the system is in that state, even if nobody is there to look at it [8] . This property is often thought as the core of objectivity, and more generally, corresponds to ordinary ontology, i.e., our usual way of seeing (classical) reality.
With the rise of quantum mechanics, the notion of physical state was seriously shaken. In particular, it appeared impossible to obtain as many certain answers as possible questions, namely, to access the full ID card of the system. The historical reason invoked was that the measuring apparatus would cause a random perturbation of the physical state, which was depicted in the famous picture of Heisenberg's microscope [4] : to know the position of an electron, it has to interact with a photon. The collision with the photon would give a momentum to the electron, hence knowing more on the position requires to know less on the momentum. This very perturbation would make the outcomes of the quantum measurement probabilistic, while the physical state would become a quantum state, a "wave function" that reflects this uncertainty. At the early times of the quantum theory, two attitudes emerged. The first, deemed "realist", claimed the physical state existed, but was not accessible because of practical reasons -among them, the perturbation induced by the measurement. QM would only describe the partial knowledge that one has on systems, not their real full physical states, hence would be incomplete [2] . The second, deemed by opposition "anti-realist", claimed that the "full physical state" is not accessible because it simply does not exist, contrary to the assumptions of classical physics [3] . It is well-known that the naive "realist" attitude described above was discarded by experimental violation of Bell's inequalities [5, 7] . Since then, successive generations of quantum physicists have progressively given up with pre-quantum conceptions. Actually, many different interpretations of QM have been proposed, and our purpose is not to discuss all of them (for a review, see e.g. [13] ) but rather to propose another perspective.
In Section II, we will first try to spell out the currently accepted -but often implicit -quantum ontology. Then in Section III and IV, we will introduce our approach, closely related to "contextual objectivity" previously introduced by one the authors [9] . So we will claim that the quantum state does exist, as required by physical realism, but that it is not what it is usually thought to be. Important consequences of this new approach will be presented in Sections V to VIII, and some related philosophical considerations will be discussed in the Annex. • and 45
• (b). The overall probability of being transmitted is respectively either 1/4 (a) or 0 (b).
II. USUAL QUANTUM ONTOLOGY
Nowadays in QM, one is accustomed to the idea that when studying a physical system, the full ID card, corresponding to the ensemble of answers to all the possible questions one can ask, is not accessible, and that the description must be restricted to the "quantum state", quite different from what the "classical state" used to be. A paradigmatic example of such quantum state is the photon polarization. It is usually measured with a polarizing beam-splitter, that can be rotated by a continuous angle θ. By definition, the polarization is |H θ (resp. |V θ ) if the photon is transmitted (resp. reflected) with certainty by a θ oriented beam-splitter. In agreement with the Malus law that applies for classical light, a photon of polarization |H θ=0 sent in a θ = 0 oriented beam-splitter will be either transmitted with probability cos 2 (θ), or reflected with probability sin 2 (θ). After the measurement, the photon is projected on the state |H θ (resp. |V θ ).
To a large extent, this picture catches the "usual quantum ontology", and gathers important characteristics of quantum mechanics. First, there are indeed less certain answers than possible questions, meaning in that specific example that the photon polarization cannot be known with certainty for all θ angles. Second, results of successive measurements depend on the ordering of the sequence; for instance, it is not equivalent to measure the polarization successively in the basis {0
• , 45
• } -in other words, measurements do not commute (see Fig.1 ). These characteristics derive from the fact that in the usual quantum ontology, measurement is a projection, from an initial state onto an eigenstate associated with a "measurement context".
Even if this conception is commonly spread, it holds many unsolved questions that makes the understanding of quantum mechanics a vivid field of debates, more than a hundred years after it was born. For instance, what does the quantum state represent: our knowledge of reality, or reality itself -in other words, is the wave function epistemic, or ontic, or a bit of both [11] ? What happens during a measurement, at the microscopic scale ? Where do probabilities come from, and how to justify them ? What happens during an EPR / Bell experiment carried out on entangled particles, and what is this "spooky action at a distance" that affects Bob's photon, when Alice measures hers ? Last but not least, measurement is at the heart of the usual quantum description -but is it possible to describe the world out of any measurement process, and thus to get rid of the so-called quantumclassical boundary [6, 10] ?
In the following we propose an alternative ontology for quantum mechanics. Let us emphasize that an ontology, that is trying to define "what really is", can never be demonstrated, but is rather a "thinking framework", which is chosen for both intuitive and practical reasons. Given our initial choice of "physical realism", we want to attribute existence to physical objects or phenomena, but neither to mathematical concepts, nor to purely mental processes. Within this framework, in the same way that quantum physicists progressively gave up with the idea that the quantum state should consist of the full ID card of the system, here we question the fact that the quantum state should pertain to the system alone. As detailed below, our perspective sheds new light on the set of conundrums reminded above, but it is unavoidable that other ontologies may also fit with the same mathematical theory -which one gives the "best fit" is ultimately the choice to be made.
III. SYSTEM, CONTEXT, AND MODALITIES
To define our ontology, our main guideline is to start from the basic question: what can we be certain of ? And more precisely, within the physical framework we are interested in, which phenomena can we predict with certainty, and obtain repeatedly ? Though a full "ID card" in the classical sense is no more available as said above, certainty and repeatability of phenomena will allow us to identify some items of an ID card; this will provide necessary conditions to be able to define a "state".
Our quantum ontology will thus involve three entities of different natures. First comes the system, that isas stated above -a subpart of the world that is isolated well enough to be studied. The system is in contact with other systems, that can be a measuring device, an environment -no need to be more specific at this point. The ensemble of these "other systems" will be called a context. A given context corresponds to a given set of questions, that can be asked together to the system. A set of answers that can be predicted with certainty and obtained repeatedly within such a context will be called a modality. Given these definitions, let us bind them together by the following rule: In QM, modalities are attributed jointly to the system and the context. This principle will be called "CSM", referring to the combination of Context, System, and Modality [14] . As a set of certain and repeatable phenomena, a modality fulfills the above conditions for the objective definition of a quantum state [9, 16] .
At this point we can emphasize that the context is classical, in the sense that no other context has to be specified to define its state. Note that here neither size, nor a quantitative criterium has been made to draw the quantum-classical boundary: the quantum vs classical behavior is only related to the CSM principle itself, i.e., to the very definition of a modality.
Obviously, CSM applies to the photon example quoted above: the system is the photon, the θ-oriented polarizer is the context, and the two possible exclusive answers/modalities in this context are either "transmitted", or "reflected". To predict with certainty if a photon will be transmitted or reflected, one has to know the modality, which includes the context it corresponds to -the angle of the polarizer in that case [17] . In the CSM perspective, a photon does not "own" a polarization, but the ensemble photon-polarizer does. If the context is known, and if the system is available, a modality defined in this same context can be recovered without error. This property has been exploited for years by quantum communication technologies, and provides the core of quantum cryptography protocols [15] . Here, we have drawn the consequences of this behavior in ontological terms.
The resulting ontology is clearly different from the classical one, where it is expected that a state should "exist" independently of any context to guarantee objectivity. But even if CSM is fundamentally non-classical, physical realism is not lost: it still pertains to the ensemble made of context, system, and modality. Objectivity, defined as the independence from any particular observer's perception, is still guaranteed, but the "object" is the system and the context, and its "properties" are modalities [9] .
It might even be argued that the CSM principle should apply to classical ontology as well, since physical states always show up in a given context. As mentioned in the introduction however, in classical physics the ordering of the questions, i.e. of the contexts that are successively in contact with the system, does not have any influence on the results, and all the questions can get a definite answer. As a consequence, the context can be forgotten, and the modality can be fully attributed to the system alone -giving birth to the ordinary classical ontology. On the contrary, in QM, the ordering in the succession of the questions has a strong influence on the answers obtained (see Fig. 1 ), and therefore the context cannot be forgotten. Hence the non-commutation of measurements mentioned above is intimately related to the CSM principle; we will come back to this in the discussion below.
Finally, we emphasize that the CSM principle is not foreign to Bohr's view, as expressed in his answer to the EPR argument [2, 3] : "The very conditions which define the possible types of predictions regarding the future behavior of the system constitute an inherent element of There is a continuous infinity of possible contexts, labelled by the angle θ of the magnetic field gradient, but only N=6 mutually exclusive modalities. The number of spots, corresponding to the number of modalities for a given orientation θ, does not change while rotating the apparatus.
the description of any phenomenon to which the term physical reality can be properly attached".
In this sentence, Bohr explicitly states that despite being classical, the "very conditions" (i.e., the context) must appear together with the system in the description of quantum phenomena. In the following, we show that the CSM principle does not come as a bolt from the blue, but is actually tightly bound to a quantization principle.
IV. QUANTIZATION PRINCIPLE
For simplicity, we will consider the situation pictured in Fig. 2 : a quantum system is described within a set of contexts, whose parameters can be changed continuously, whereas the measurement results (the modalities) are discrete and in a finite number [18] . This is a quite general and canonical situation of quantum mechanics, which describes for instance a spin interacting with a Stern-Gerlach apparatus, a photon analyzed with a polarizing beam-splitter, or a quantum measurement on an ensemble of qubits.
In a given context, the modalities are "mutually exclusive", meaning that if one modality is true, the others are wrong. On the other hand, modalities obtained in different contexts are generally not mutually exclusive: they are said to be "incompatible", meaning that if one modality is true, one cannot tell whether the others are true or wrong.
This terminology applies to modalities, not to contexts, that are classically defined: changing the context results from changing the measurement apparatus at the macroscopic level, that is, "turning the knobs". These context transformations have the mathematical structure of a continuous group, that will be denoted G: the combination of several transformations is associative and gives a new transformation, there is a neutral element (corresponding to no change of context), and each transfor-mation has an inverse. In the following, we will thus consider infinitely many contexts, all related by the continuous group G, and belonging to a set C.
These definitions allow us to state the following quantization principle:
(i) For each well-defined system and context, there is a discrete number N of mutually exclusive modalities. This number N does not depend on any particular context within the set C.
(ii) Modalities, when defined in different contexts within C, are generally not mutually exclusive, and they are said to be "incompatible".
Otherwise stated, whereas infinitely many questions can be asked, corresponding to all possible contexts, only a finite number N of mutually exclusive modalities can be obtained (Fig. 2 ). An essential consequence is that it is impossible to get more details on a given system by combining several contexts, because this would create a new context with more than N mutually exclusive modalities, contradicting the above quantization principle. The resulting impossibility to define a unique context where all modalities are mutually exclusive also makes that the succession of observed modalities depends on the sequence of contexts applied to the system (Fig. 1) . As mentioned above, it is therefore forbidden to attribute definite physical properties to the system alone, in agreement with the CSM principle. Note that in our perspective, CSM does not show up because of some practical reasons pertaining to the measurement protocol, but is intimately linked to the quantization principle. In the following, we revisit some of the main features of quantum theory within this new framework.
V. PROBABILITIES
As a first important conceptual consequence, we argue that quantum mechanics must be a probabilistic theory, not due to any "hidden variables", but due to the ontology of the theory. The argument runs as follows: let us consider a single system, two different contexts C 1 and C 2 , and the associated modalities M (C 1 , n) and M (C 2 , m), where n and m go from 1 to N. As said above, the quantization principle forbids to gather all the modalities M (C 1 , n) and M (C 2 , m) in a single set of 2N mutually exclusive modalities. With the previous example, this would be like knowing with certainty one the 4 possible results for the photon going through a polarizer oriented at 0
• , and through a polarizer oriented at 45
• , in conflict with N = 2. Therefore the only relevant question to be answered by the theory is: if the initial modality is M (C 1 , n) in context C 1 , what is the conditional probability for obtaining modality M (C 2 , m) when the context is changed from C 1 to C 2 ? Again, such a probabilistic description is the unavoidable consequence of the impossibility to define a unique context making all modalities mutually exclusive, as it would be done in classical physics. It appears therefore as a joint consequence of the quantization and CSM principles, i.e. that modalities are quantized, and require a context to be defined.
Note that in the CSM picture as described so far, a "measurement" is nothing but a change of context. As we will see below (section VIII), this does not forbids to look for a more microscopic description of a measurement, e.g. by coupling the initial system to an "ancilla". But this will simply lead to define some new and larger system and context, in which the previous scheme will apply again.
VI. ABOUT THE EPR ARGUMENT
Second, CSM sheds new light on the EPR argument [2] . To show this, let us consider two spin 1/2 particles in the singlet state, shared between Alice and Bob. The singlet state is a modality among four mutually exclusive modalities defined in a context relevant for the two spins, where measurements of the total spin (and any component of this spin) will certainly and repeatedly give a zero value. On the other hand, the singlet state is incompatible with any modality attributing definite values to the spin components of the separate particles in their own (spatially separated) contexts. Now, let us assume that Alice performs a measurement on her particle, far from Bob's particle. Alice's result is random as expected, but what happens on Bob's side? Since Bob's particle is far away, the answer is simply that nothing happens. How to explain the strong correlation between measurements on the two particles? By the fact that after her measurement, Alice can predict with certainty the state of Bob's particle; however, this certainty applies jointly to the new context (owned by Alice) and to the new system (owned by Bob). The socalled "quantum non-locality" arises from this separation, and the hidden variables from the impossible attempt to attribute properties to Bob's particle only, whereas properties must be attributed jointly to Alice's context and Bob's system. Getting them together is required for any further step, hence the irrelevance of any influence on Bob's system following Alice's measurement. Here the separation between context and system is particularly obvious and crucial, since they are in different places.
Again, such a situation, though strongly non-classical, does not conflict with physical realism or causality: in the CSM perspective, quantum non-locality is a direct consequence of the bipartite nature of (quantum) reality.
VII. BORN'S FORMULA
We understand now that QM must be a probabilistic theory, but we know also that classical probability theories will not do the job, due to the theorems by KochenSpecker and Bell [6, 7] . A new probability theory is therefore required, and our framework perfectly fits [19] with the usual postulate: Let us associate to each modality a (rank-one) projector in an Hilbert space, so that any set of N mutually exclusive modalities M (C i , n) in a given context C i is associated to a set of N mutually orthogonal projectors Π(C i , n) summing up to identity. Then Gleason's theorem [20] states that the only possible way to write the conditional probability
this is the usual Born formula. Within the framework of separable Hilbert spaces (or von Neumann algebra), it is well known that our initial restriction to a finite dimension N can actually be lifted, recovering the usual (Dirac -von Neumann) formulation of QM [21] .
Since we have now reached the starting point of QM textbooks [22] , it appears that the usual structure of QM is fully compatible with our approach; in particular rewriting physical quantities as operators and states as rays is straightforward. With respect to standard textbook presentations, the main differences are:
• quantum probabilities do not happen "by chance"
and have nothing to do with ignorance, but they are a consequence of the quantization postulate;
• quantum non-locality has nothing to do with an "action at a distance", but appears because a modality belongs to both a system and a context;
• there is no "measurement postulate", since it is already included in the definition of modalities.
More precisely, in our approach there is no "wave function" developing upwards and utimately branching into a "many-world" universe [13] , but only (non-classical) probabilities connecting modalities appearing in different contexts. These probabilities are calculated using the standard quantum formalism, and thus they may involve interfering paths, as usual; however, there is no "wave", but only a "wavelike behaviour" due to the quantum way to calculate probabilities, through projections in an Hilbert space. In our "physically realist" point of view, the mathematical state vector (or wave function) should be carefully distinguished from the modality, i.e. from the phenomenon defining the "object" (see Annex).
VIII. CONCLUSION
We shall conclude with a few remarks. First, contextual objectivity [9] allows for an ontology to QM, this is the joint reality of the context, system, and modalities (CSM). This leads to reinterpret quantum nonlocality as the situation where the context and the system are separated in space: though the certainty (modality) is present, it cannot be "verified" or "actualized" as long as the context and the system are not put together again. Such a situation has no conflict with physical realism, but never happens in classical physics, where the physical properties are carried by the system alone.
Second, let us note that for many physicists, putting the context in the very heart of the theory implied an unacceptable "shifty split" [6, 10] between the quantum world (attributed to the system) and the classical world (of the context). A lot of efforts have been made to get rid of it, especially to make the classical world emerge from the quantum world, by attempts to describe contexts within the quantum formalism. Such attempts may exploit the fact that there is a considerable flexibility for defining the boundaries of the system, especially when considering that (weak or strong) measurements can be done by entangling the initial system with a "meter" (or ancilla) system, e.g. by doing Quantum Non Demolition (QND) measurements [23] . But in our approach, extending such measurements to include the context is self-contradictory: even by adding more and more "meters", the system can never grow up to the point of including the context. This is because without the context, modalities cannot be defined, leaving the system as a fuzzy object including everything, quite unsatisfactory from the perspective of physical realism.
The quantum-classical boundary has therefore a fundamental character, and QM was born from it, both from a physical and from a philosophical point of view, as it is discussed in more details in the Annex below. In a nutshell, the CSM approach presented here, without restricting the generality nor the applicability of QM, acknowledges the fact that, as a scientific discipline, QM "can explain anything, but not everything" [24] .
As a final remark, Bohr's arguments in [3] were quite right, but perhaps failed to answer a major question asked in essence by EPR in [2] : can a physical theory be "complete" if it does not provide an ontology that should be clearly compatible with physical realism ? Unveiling such an ontology is what we propose to do here.
Annex: Some philosophical remarks on the nature of physical reality.
From a philosophical point of view, let us first emphasize again that we adopt the point of view of physical realism, telling that the purpose of physics is to study entities of the natural world, existing independently from any particular observer's perception, and obeying universal and intelligible rules. Therefore philosophical issues like the separation between subject vs object are definitely out of our scope: we are interested in defining "objects" consistent with QM, and we claim this is possible -though not in a "naive" (classical) sense.
Here we want to discuss an objection which can be made to CSM, and could also be made to Bohr's answer to EPR: in ordering to keep the above arguments consistent, the context seems to acquire a special status, "evading" the quantum description of reality which is being built. This objection can be answered relatively easily, but this requires a distinction between two notions of reality, that occur frequently in the history of philosophy.
The first kind of reality is the "ultimate material reality", constituted by all the objects in nature which are, from a scientific point of view, made of particles, waves and all their combinations, giving rise to macroscopic objects. There is no need to be very specific about what this reality is made of, but it must have a major property: it does exist -i.e. it is external to our thinking -even if we know very little about it. And in some sense, we cannot know much about it, because it is just too complicated. It also has to be a "global" reality, because no part of it should play a particular role. It could also be called "absolute reality", here we will call it "ultimate reality".
The second kind of reality is "empirical reality", this is the reality of phenomena that are amenable to scientific knowledge. Empirical reality has two main properties: it is real, it does exist independently of the "observer", because it is obviously part of the ultimate reality; and it can be known, which means that it can be perceived and apprehended by the observer, as knowledge must (also obviously) pertain to perceiving and thinking agents. Scientific knowledge of empirical reality is thus a synthesis of facts -"what is really going on" (in some subset of the ultimate reality), -and concepts, elaborated through the observation and formalization of what is going on. It is precisely this synthesis that produces "understanding", what we sometimes call the "aha!" effect.
As said before, this distinction between ultimate and empirical realities is very old, probably as old as philosophy, but physicists often ignore it, and think that physics can address directly the ultimate reality, by defining, attributing and measuring properties that belong unconditionally to "real objects". Unfortunately, this way of thinking leads to a dead end as far as QM is concerned.
Actually, physics always deals with empirical reality, not with ultimate reality. Its duty is to describe phenomena with mathematical tools, which will allow one to predict the values of measurable physical quantities. These measurements and their mathematical formalization take place in a framework where phenomena can occur and eventually be described and measured. In practice, this framework is the classical macroscopic world, and though this appears only as a practical requirement, it can hardly be escaped, due to the very nature of empirical reality. Let us emphasize that this statement does not restrict physics only to "what can be perceived". All along its history, physics has elaborated concepts that take an ontological value, such as atoms, and it is perfectly entitled to do so, because empirical reality is grounded on ultimate reality. Atoms are a very good example of such a progress: in the 19th century, they were introduced as abstract hypothetical entities with a strong explanatory power, then they were identified, and now they can easily be "seen" and manipulated at the individual level. More generally, physical concepts such as photon, electron, charge, mass, energy, fields... are also entities required for describing the empirical reality in a synthetic way, referring again to the above mentioned synthesis of "what is going on" -the facts out there -and of its observation and formalization through physical, conceptual and mathematical tools that belong to science. Now we can consider again the difference between classical and quantum mechanics (see Fig. 3 ). In both, one deals with empirical reality grounded on ultimate reality, but in classical physics, one can easily get the delusion that knowing the state of the system is knowing directly the ultimate reality. In quantum mechanics, this is clearly wrong, because empirical reality must be mediated by a classical context, and the latter cannot be ignored. The context is always part of the ultimate reality, and its own very details in terms of particle, fields etc. certainly "exist". However, they are not relevant as far as the definition of a (CSM) modality is concerned: here the context is only considered as a necessary practical condition allowing the physicist to define the system, which is a physically-grounded but abstract concept, like the atoms are. The context's role is to reveal a phenomenon, the modality, which must obviously be accessible to the observer, in ordering for knowledge to take place.
Given all that, a modality in CSM is essentially a "phenomenon" -a matter of fact -which involves a context (as a practical requirement) and a system (as a physicallygrounded concept), and which provides measurement results, that can be known and reproduced with certainty. One should also notice that most experiments do not give access to the "full modality", because of experimental imperfections: some properties may not be measured properly; experimental devices may add some noise, etc. However, the essential point is that, according to QM, modalities (i.e., pure quantum states) do exist as real phenomena, and the whole theory is based on that. In addition, the modality as a phenomenon is objective, i.e. it can occur anywhere, and requires no role for belief or for any agent's crucial presence. Though observation is part of scientific knowledge as a human endeavor, it is not required for the phenomenal existence of a modality.
It should be clear also that the "cut" or "split" [10] is a requirement at the level of empirical reality, in ordering to specify the observed phenomenon, but at the level of ultimate reality, it does not imply that the macroscopic world is different in nature from the microscopic one. It rather means that in QM, macroscopic properties are required to describe phenomena, because the context cannot be ignored, due to the combination of the CSM and quantization postulates introduced above. Therefore for empirical consistency, the quantum system with its either mutually exclusive or incompatible modalities has to connect somewhere to the macroscopic world, where quantization does not show up at first sight.
As a conclusion, a lot of trouble in QM results from a confusion between ultimate reality and empirical reality, associated with the classical delusion of "speaking directly" about ultimate reality. But this is no more possible in quantum mechanics, due to the empirical frontier imposed by the quantization postulate. Again, quantum mechanics can describe anything, but one should be very careful with attempts at using it to describe everything.
